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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  analyses  the evolution of  the  labour  share  in  major 
countries  of  the  European  Communities,  the  United  States,  and  Japan.  The 
definition of  the  labour  share  is expanded  to  take  into  account  the  role of 
taxation,  of  economic  structure, of  wage  push,  of  changes  in the terms  of 
trade,  and  of  productivity growth.  The  contributions of  these factors to 
changes  in the  labour  share  vary  significantly  among  the  countries of  the 
Community,  the  United  States,  and  Japan.  In  all  countries the  largest 
variations  are  found  in real  consumption  wages,  terms  of  trade changes,  and 
productivity growth.  In  some  countries payroll  taxes  had  a  significant 
effect  on  the  increase of  the  labour  share,  most  so  in  Belgium. 
When  employment  is regressed on  cost  and  demand  variables the growth 
of  the  labour  share  turns out  to  have  a  significant  negative effect  on  employ-
ment  in  most  countries.  We  conclude therefore that  employment  growth  is  not 
purely  demand  determined  and  that  the  very  strong  increase  in  labour  costs 
which  occurred during  the  1970s  in the  Community,  but  not  in the  United 
States,  has  been  a  major  reason  for  the stationarity of  employment  in 
Europe  as  compared  to  historical  record growth  of  employment  in the  United 
States during  that  period. 
The  paper  has  some  implications  for  policy  which  are  summarised  in 
the  Conclusions. ( i i ) 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
During  recent  years  unemployment  has  risen  in  virtually all  OECD 
economies  as  a  result of  high  growth  of the  labour  force  combined  with 
slower  or  negative growth  in  employment.  Among  the explanations of the 
employment  evolution figure  prominently the  supply  shocks of the seventies, 
which  have  imposed  on  OECD  countries  the  need  for  major  structural  adjust-
ments.  These  adjustments  are  however  very  slowly  forthcoming,  partly due 
to  wage  and  other  rigidities,  so  that  the employment  loss  in declining 
activities  has  not  been  matched  by  employment  creation  in  expanding  sectors. 
Wage  rigidities  themselves,  in  the  face of external  terms  of trade  losses, 
are  claimed  to  have  contributed  to  declining profit  shares of  the  corporate 
sector  and  this  decline  in profits  is often  considered  as  a  major  reason  for 
the observed  reduction  in gross  capital  formation  and  hence  of  job creation. 
Furthermore,  high  real  wage  costs  relative to profits  might  have  encouraged 
the  use  of  a  larger  part of  already  reduced  capital  formation  for  replacing 
jobs  by  machines  instead of  creating  additional  employment. 
While  restrictive demand  management  is  likely to  have  exacerbated  the 
unemployment  problem  in  some  countries  this paper  focusses  on  the  role of 
distributive shares of  factor  payments.  The  evolution of  factor  shares  is 
considered  as particularly relevant  for  understanding  the differences of 
employment  growth  across  countries.  For  example,  from  1973  to  1982  private 
sector  employment  in  the  United  States  has  increased  by  over  12  million 
whereas  it  has  declined  by  nearly 2  million  in  the  EEC  and  this difference 
cannot  be  explained only  in  terms  of the oil shocks  or  of  the  worldwide 
reduction  in  demand  growth. 
The  paper  is organised  as  follows.  Section 2  gives  reasons  for 
focussing  on  distributive shares  and  their  significance  in  the growth  process. 
Section  3 proposes  a  detailed decomposition of the  contributing  factors  to 
the evolution of distributive shares.  For  the  major  OECD  countries  calcul-
ations of  these  contributing  factors  are presented  in  Section  4  and  inter-
preted  in  terms  of the shocks  which  occurred  and  the policies pursued  in 
these countries.  In  Section  5  regression  analysis  is  applied  to test the 
effects of  changes  in factor  shares on  employment  growth.  It  is  found  that 
changes  in  income  distribution are  highly  significant  for  the evolution of 
employment.  In  Section 6  the  main  conclusions  are  summarised  and  some  policy 
implications are  suggested. -2-
2.  THE  RELEVANCE  OF  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  FOR  THE  GROWTH  PROCESS 
For  an  assessment  of  the  relationship  between  the evolution of 
income  distribution  and  of employment,  and  the  related  issues of domestic 
investment  and  international  competitivity, one  would  ideally wish  to  use 
an  internationally-linked general  equilibrium  model.  The  difficulties of 
constructing  and  maintaining  a  reliable  and  easily understandable  model  of 
this  kind  are,  however,  formidable.  Existing  international  models  usually 
exhibit  excessive technical  complexity  and  analytical  intractability (the 
"black  box"  property). 
Short  of  a  satisfactory  international  general  equilibrium  model, 
applied  economists  use  summary  indicators  containing  synthetised  and,  hope-
fully,  useful  information.  Prominent  use  is  being  made  of unit  labour  costs 
(ULC)  and  of  labour's distributive share  <s>,  respectively defined  as  : 
(1)  ULC  _  wE/Y 
and 
(2)  s  =  wE/pY 
where  w =  wage  costs  (including  payroll  taxes),  E =  employment,  Y  =value-
added  at  constant prices,  p  = deflator  of  value-added. 
ULC  is  a  measure  of the  labour  cost  per  unit  of  value-added or, 
macroeconomically,  per  unit  of gross  domestic  product  (GOP).  If  the  cost 
of  capital  and  the structure of  production  were  not  too  divergent  among 
countries,  ULCs  could  be  usefully  compared  internationally.  Diverging 
trends of  ULCs  in  any  particular  country  relative to  its competitors  could 
then  be  interpreted  as  gains or  losses  in  international  competitivity. 
Labour's  distributive share  has  some  advantages  over  ULCs  for  the 
purpose of this paper.  First,  while  ULCs  for  any  single  country  are 
meanin3less  numbers  regaining  interpretability only  when  related  to  ULCs 
of  competitors,  the distributive share  is  a  number  in  the  closed  interval 
(0,1) which  can  be  more  easily  interpreted.  Computation  of  the  labour  share 
is also  useful  because 1- s  represents  the  share of  capital  income,  also 
called the profit  share  when  Y us  defined  as  net  national  oroduct11• 
1/ This  terminology  does  not  correspond  to  the  usual  definitions of pure 
profit  since  included  in  the profit  share  are  rents  and  interest payments. -3-
In policy-oriented  reports~/ it is  frequently  emphasised  that 
increases  in  Labour's  distributive share  above  some  (implicit)  reference 
level  tend  to  have  unfavourable  consequences  for  gross  capital  formation  in 
general  and  for  job-creating  investments  in particular.  The  effect on  gross 
capital  formation  is  attributed both  to  increased financial  constraints on 
investment  when  the capital  share declines,  an  effect  which  would  be  absent 
with perfect  capital  markets,  and  reduced  incentives  for  capital  formation. 
An  additional  consequence  is  the substitution effect due  to  an  increase  in 
the price of  labour  relative to  capital. 
Researchers  have  in general  been  rather  unsuccessful  in verifying 
empiricalLy  the  importance of distributive shares  for  employment  growth. 
One  remarkable  "classical"  result,  namely  that  increases  in  the profit 
share  cause  an  increase  in  employment,  was  obtained  by  Morley  (1979).  He 
estimates  unemployment  in the  United  Kingdom  as  a  function  of the profit 
share and obtains  a  strong  negative correlation between  unemployment  and  Lagged 
profit  shares lZ  Some  further  evidence  was  obtained  by  the  OECD  (1982),  where 
wage  costs,  measured  by  real  wages  or  by  the  wage  gap !!.I,  have  a  significant 
impact  on  employment  growth,  thus  warranting  close  attention. 
What  does  not  emerge  clearly from  these  considerations is  whether 
full  employment  is  compatible  with  any,  finitely  many,  or only  one  value of 
distributive shares.  This  is an  important  question  for  evaluating  the 
increases  in  labour  shares that  can  be  observed  in  some  countries. 
Some  Light  can  be  shed  on  this question  by  the  theory of  income  dis-
tribution under  perfect  competition.  We  use  a  constant-elasticity-substitution 
(CES)  technology  (Arrow  et  al., 1961),  summarised  by  the production  function  : 
1 
C3>  v=r/oKc +C1-o)Ec7c 
where  Y,  K,  E are  value-added  (GOP),  capital  and  Labour  employment,  resp.: 
r, o,  and  c  are  the efficiency, distribution  and  substitution parameters, resp., 
2/  See,  for  example,  the  Annual  Report  of the  Bank  of  International  Settlements, 
the  World  Economic  Outlook  of the  International  Monetary  Fund,  and  various 
publications of  the  OECD  and  the  EEC. 
3/  However,  since  he  does  not  find  any  significant  relationship  between  the 
level  of  employment  and  profit shares,  most  of  the  impact  on  unemployment  may 
be  due  to  effects on  the  Labour  supply. 
~/ Defined  as  the difference  between  the  indexes  of unit  Labour  costs  and  of 
output prices,  hence  a  measure  of the  labour  share. -4-
with  c  =  -<1-o)/o,  where  o> 0  is the elasticity of  substitution.  With 
o ~ 1  the  CES  production function  collapses to  Cobb-Douglas  technology. 
When  firms  are  on  their  Labour  demand  schedule  so  that  product  wages 
(defined  as  w = wT/PF,  where  wT  = wage  compensation per  man  including  payroll 
taxes,  PF  = GOP  deflator  at  factor  costs)  equal  marginal  Labour  productivity, 
labour's  share  of  value  added  (s)  is obtained  from  (3)  : 
(4a)  s::  wTE/P F Y 
(4b)  = rc (1- O)  (Y/E) -c, 
and  c ap i t a l ' s  s hare  eq ua l s  1 - s •  ( 4b)  i s  a  r e l at i on  between  Labour ' s  s hare 
and  average  labour  productivity n  = Y/E.  Logarithmic  differentiation of  (4b) 
yields 
(5 a)  s  = - c n  =-c<v-e> 
where.,.,. denotes  a  percentage  change per  unit  of  time.  (4a)  and  <Sa)  imply 
(5b)  ""  ""  ""  ,.  w =  wT  - P F =  (1 I  o) n 
From  (Sa)  and  (5b)  it  is seen  that  with  o = 1,  an  exogenous  rise in 
the product  wage  is fully  compensated  by  an  increase  in productivity due  to 
an  increase  in  the  capital-labour  ratio.  Hence  labour's share  remains  unchanged. 
With  o  <  1  the  adjustment  in productivity is only partial  and  hence  labour's 
share  rises. 
As  to  the  relationship  between  employment  and  Labour  shares,  two 
cases  have  to  be  distinguished.  If  labour  markets  are  competitive full  employ-
ment  is  maintained,  GDP  is  determined  by  the production function,  and  the 
product  wage  growth  compatible  with  full  employment  is determined  by  (5b). 
Hence  for  a  given  capital  stock  and  full  employment  there  is  a  unique  level  of 
real  wages  and  of  labour's share. 
The  other  case  arises  when  product  wages  are  exogenously  determined. 
As  long  as  firms  remain  on  their  labour  demand  curve  the production function 
and  (5b)  together  determine  employment  and  output growth. 
There  is therefore  a  mapping  between  product  wages  and  employment  and 
between  the  labour  share  and  employment  if o  :f.  1.  If  O=  1  labour's  share  is 
constant and the equilibrium el'f1)loyment  level is  independent  of  the  labour  share. -5-
Clearly, if firms  are  not  on  their  labour  demand  curve  because  they 
are  demand  constrained the  mapping  between  employment  and  product  wages,  or the 
labour  share  breaks  down.  Therefore,  only "classical" unemployment  can  be 
meaningfully  related to  the  labour  share. 
implies 
The  wage  gap  can  be  defined  by  noting  that  in  full  employment  (5b) 
(6)  "*  w  1  "* 
=-R 
0 
where  stars  denote  full  employment  values.  Substracting  (6)  from  (Sb)  yields 
the  wage  gap 
(?a)  g  "'*  1  ..... *  w  =  w - w  = - ( l[  -1[  ) 
0 
With  Cobb-Douglas  technology o  = 1  and  the marginal  product of  labour  is propor-
tional  to  the  average product,  so  that 
g  ...  ...  *  "* 
(7 b)  w  =  l[ - l[  = w - l[ 
i.e., product  wage  growth  above  full  employment  average  labour  productivity 
growth  indicates  a  wage  gap  and  a  level  of  errployment  below  full  employment. 
With  Cobb-Douglas  technology  a  wage  gap  can,  of  course,  only  arise due 
to  the time  required  for  real  wages  and  productivity  to  adjust  :  in  equilibrium 
there  can  be  no  wage  gap. 
Basevi  et  al.  (1983)  reject  both  labour  shares  and  wage  gap  measures 
as  useful  indicators of the existence  and  size of  a  wage  problem.  They  advance 
three  arguments  : 
(i)  With  an  exogenous  increase in real  wages  the  change  in the competitive 
labour  shares  depends  on  the. elasticity of  substitution.  From  (Sb)  it is  imme-
diately  seen  that s  ~  0  as  o ~ 1  and  a= 1  ~  s = 0.  It  is  th~refore important  to 
assess  the empirical  value of a.  Unfortunately  the empirical  evidence  is not 
conclusive,  as  can  be  seen  from  Table 1, where  several  frequently  quoted  empiri-
cal  results  are  reproduced.  For  the  United  States the evidence  suggests  a  high 
elasticity of substitution between  capital  and  labour  so  that  o = 1  seems  to 
be  a  reasonable  assumption  whereas  for  the  European  countries  the  evidence 
suggests  that  O< 1.  This  difference  between  the  United  States  and  the  European T
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countries  is also  confirmed  by  the differences  in  the evolution of  labour 
shares  (see  Tables  3  and  4  in  Section 3)  :  labour's share  remained  more 
stable during  1960-80  in the  United  States than  in  the  European  countries or 
Japan. 
But  even  the evidence  for  the  United  States  is not  clear.  Kendrick  and 
Sato  (1963)  found  that  labour's share  had  been  rising  from  1919  to  1960. 
Nordhaus  (1974)  has  provided  evidence  that  a  rising  relative cost  of  labour 
combined  with  a  low  elasticity of  substitution  has  caused  labour's  share  to 
increase. 
In  view  of  the conflicting  empirical  evidence  and  the fact  that  a  close to 
unity  would  imply  a  product  wage  elasticity of  labour  demand  between  -3.0 
and  -S.O,  which  is  in conflict  with  the  available empirical  evidence,  the 
c as  e  of  a < 1  i s  ret a i ned  i n  t h i s  paper • 
We  would  therefore  expect  that  real  wage  growth  results  in  increasing  labour 
shares  which  will  lead,  with  a<1,  to  a  decline  in  equilibrium employment 
via  condition  (Sa). 
(ii)  Basevi  et  al.  also  observe that  real  wage  gaps  vary  substantially 
across  countries,  but  with  little relation to  their employment  experience. 
The  weakness  of  this  argument  is that,  as  revealed  by  equations  (Sa),  labour 
shares are  not  the only explanatory  variable of employment  growth.  The 
possible  relationship  between  labour  shares  and  employment  needs  therefore to 
be  tested  by  multiple  regression.  This  will  be  done  in  Section 4. 
(iii)  Finally,  as  pointed out  by  Basevi  et  al., after  a  real  wage  increase, 
productivity  may  first  decline  as  employment  is adjusted  more  slowly  than output. 
Over  time,  labour  substitution takes  place  and  productivity  increases to 
compensate  for  the rise in  real  wages.  Labour's  share  will  therefore decline 
although  this is achieved  through  a  reduction  in  employment. 
The  adjustment  path  to  a  real  wage  shock  with  costs  for  adapting  factor 
allocations is illustrated  in  Figure  1 -for  a  stationary economy.  Any  underlying 
trend growth  can  be  treated  additively to this  stationary  analysis.  In  Fig.  1a 
the initial  equilibrium is at point <l.  Due  to  an  exogenous  increase  in real 
product  wages  the  marginal  product  of  labour  curve  m increases tom'.  If employ-
ment  reductions  are  costly, the initi at-reaction--of  firms  is to  reduce  pro-
duction  from  a  to  B.  Over  time,  and  with  a  given  capital  stock, employment 
would  be  reduced  and  output  would  decline toward  the equilibrium  level r. -8-
At  this point,  labour  productivity, measured  by  a  ray  through  the origin  and 
point 'Y,  would  be  above  the productivity  corresponding  to a, whereas  during 
the early  adjustment  process productivity falls  below  the  level  at a.  (With 
o <  1, the  capital  share  at  'Y  is  lower  than  the one  at a).  At  'Y,  less  labour 
is employed  per  unit  of  capital  so  that  the  marginal  product  of  capital 
declines.  If  the cost of  capital  remains  constant,  as  would  be  the  case  in  an 
open  economy,  the optimal  capital  stock declines.  Over  time  therefore,  as  the 
capital  stock  is being  reduced,  the production  schedule  Q shifts downwards  and 
equilibrium  will  be  reached  at  a  point 9.  At  6, employment,  the capital  stock 
and  output  are  lower  than  at a, whereas  productivity  and  the  labour  share 
(with  o  <  1)  are  higher.  Figure  1b  schematises  the  adjustment  path  after  a 
permanent  real  wage  shock  for  employment,  productivity, the  labour  share  and 
the p reduct  wage  2J. 
The  foregoing  discussion,  incitantly, shows  that  wage  gaps  and  labour  shares 
provide  complementary  information.  If  Cobb-Douglas  technology  is assumed,  then 
in the  long  run  the rise in  average  labour  productivity offsets the  increase 
in  wage  costs  and  labour's  share  remains  unchanged.  During  the  adjustment 
period  where  productivity falls,  the  wage  gap,  as  defined  in  (7b),  declines 
and  gives  a  wrong  signal  whereas  labour's  share  increases  and  points to  an 
employment  problem.  With  o<1, the  longer-run  response of productivity  will 
not  compensate  for  the  real  wage  increase  and  Labour's  share  will  remain 
above  the value  consistent  with  full  employment. 
5/ Krugman  (1982)  derives  a  different,  in our  view  erroneous,  adjustment 
path.  Treating  Labour  as  a  quasi-fixed factor  the permanent  real  wage 
increase results  at  the  initial  capital-Labour  ratio  in  average  capital 
returns  below  marginal  capital  returns.  If  labour  is fixed  capital 
must  increase until  marginal  and  average  capital  returns are  equalised. 
Once  equilibrium is established  at  a  higher  capital-labour  ratio, employ-
ment  growth  can  resume.  If  labour  can  be  adjusted  downwards  there  will 
then  be  an  initial fall  in  employment  until  growth  resumes. 
This  argument  neglects,  however,  the equilibrium  conditions  for  the 
capital  and  Labour  markets.  They  can  be  written  as  FK(K,L)  =  't and 
FL(K,L)  = w,  where  Tis the  cost  of  capital.  This't  is not  solely 
determined  by  investment  and  in  an  open  economy,  can  be  taken  as  given. 
Since  both  equations describe  Long-run  equilibrium  conditions,  it does  not 
make  sense to  treat  labour  as  a  permanently-fixed  factor.  The  factor 
market  equilibrium  conditions  determine  long-run  K and  L,  and  following 
an  increase  in  w,  L falls,  K falls  but  less than  L,  so  that  K/L  increases, 
as  we  argued  in  the text. -9-
*** **  *  L  L  L 
Figure  1a  The  effects of  a  real  wage  shock  on  equilibrium  employment  and 
capital  stock. 
Eff1) Loyment 
Productivity 
Labour 
share 
Product 
wage 
Figure  1b  Adjustment  paths of selected variables  with  a< 1. 
time 
time -10-
3.  CONTRIBUTING  FACTORS  TO  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  LABOUR  SHARES 
3.1  Definitions 
The  definitionofthe  Labour  share  as  in  (2)  is based on  real  wage  costs 
and  Labour  productivity.  Wage  costs  CWT)  depend  on  several  tactors  wh1ch  are 
at  least  in  the  short  run  and  under  certain  institutional  arrangements 
exogenous  :  payroll  taxes  represent  an  important  part  of  wage  costs;  either 
nominal  or  even  real  wages  may  be  set  by  unions  through  implicit  or explicit 
indexation  schemes;  if unions  aim  at  real  wages,  then  the  consumer  price  index 
(pc)  enters  into definition  (2).  The  consumer  price,  in turn,  is  influenced 
by  import  prices  and  the  structure of  domestic  consumption.  The  deflator  for 
domestic  value-added,which  is relevant  for  producers,  is the  deflator  at 
factor  costs  (pF).  This  price,  in turn,  depends  on  world  market  prices tor 
exports  (p  )  and  on  the  structure of  domestic  product1on.  Hence,  it is usefuL 
X 
to  expand  C2)  to  shed  light on  the  contributing  factors  to the growth  of  the 
labour  share. 
The  OECD,  for  example,  has  expanded  definition  (2),  after  logarithmic 
differentiation,  as  follows 
( 8 )  s  =  WT  - p F  - J[  = (  WT  - p  c)  +  ( p  c  - p  M)  +  ( p M - p  F)  - J[ 
where  PM  = GOP  deflator  at  market  orices i~ 
In  definition  (8),  the  fi~st  term on  the  right-hand  side  CRHS) 
measures  the growth  of  emplovment  compensations  deflated  by  the  consumer  price 
index, the  second  term is dominated  bv  terms of  trade  changes,  the third  compo-
nent  reflects  indirect  taxes  and  sub~idies,  and  the  final  term  corresponds  to 
average  labour  productivity growth. 
6/  Computations  based  on  a  similar  formula  for  EC  countries, the  United 
States,  and  Japan  are  contained  in  "Real  Wages  and  Employment",  Note  for  the 
attention of  the  Economic  Policy  Committee,  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities,  II/214/82-E,  rev.1,  1982. - 11-
Definition  (8)  is somewhat  unsatisfactory  because  the  first  term 
neither  measures  product  wages  nor  real  wage  payments  (consumption  wages) 
as  they  enter  indexation  schemes  or  wage  negotiations.  Similarly, it is also 
not  clear  what  is measured  by  the  second  term  in  addition  to  terms  of trade 
effects.  The  following  expansion  remedies  these  two  shortcomings. 
(9)  ;  = <  w - w > + <  P  - P  >  + <  P  - P > + <  P  - P > + <  w - P > + <  P -P  > -it  T  c  M  F  c  m  x  M  c  c  m  x 
where  Pm  =import  price  index,  Px  =export price  index,  and  We=  index  of  wage 
payments  per  dependently  employed. 
The  interpretation of definition  (9)  is straightforward.  The  first 
term on  the  RHS  measures  variations  in payroll  taxes;  the  second  term 
variations  in  indirect  taxes  and  subsidies.  Thus,  both  terms  reflect taxation 
effects on  the  labour  share. 
The  third  and  fourth  terms  reflect  structural effects: (pc -pm) <0 
irrplies that  inflationary pressure  is imported  while  (pc- Pm)  > 0  indicates 
that  internal  factors  aggravate  imported  inflation reflecting  therefore the 
structure of  domestic  demand  and  the effects of  macroeconomic  demand  manage-
ment.  The  fourth  term  (px- PM)  is positive if the  country's  resource 
allocation gives rise to  a  favourable  international  specialisation  so  that 
export  prices  rise  more  rapidly  than  average  producer prices in the economy. 
This  variable  is therefore  influenced  by  the  structure of production of  the 
economy. 
The  fifth  term  (W  -P  ) measures  the growth  of  real  wage  payments  c  c 
and  thus the  wage-push  contribution to the growth  of  the  labour  share.  The 
sixth  term  (pm- Px)  stands  for  changes  in the  terms  of trade  and  the  last 
term  (n)  for  changes  in productivity. 
Expansion  (9)  only  takes  into  account  payroll  taxes  and  indirect 
taxes  and  subsidies.  The  complement  1- s  represents the gross  share of 
capital.  Direct  taxes on  capital  income  can  also  be  incorporated  by 
redefining  s.  What  is relevant  for  economic  decisions  is not  the gross share 
but the  share  net  of  taxes.  Denoting  the  amount  of  taxes  (for precise 
definition  see  the Appendix)  paid  by  the  corporate  sector  by  TC,  the  net 
capital  share  can  be  defined  as  : -12-
Moreover,  rational  wage  bargaining  should  be  based  on  net  wages  and 
not  on  gross  wages.  Denoting  income  taxes paid  by  labour  by  T,  net  wage 
incomes  per  worker  are  equal  to  Wet /P c  where  t  = 1- T/WCE.  Incorporation of 
both  tax  effects  leads  to  the  following  expansion  of  a  redefined  labour 
share  s•  due  to  the  addition  of  business  taxes  : 
<11)  ;. =  <w  -w  )+<P  -P  )+z+<P  -P  )+<P  -P  )+<w  +t-P  )-t+<P  -P  )-n  T  c  M  F  c  m  c  M  c  c  m  x 
For  the empirical  computations of expansions  (9)  and  (11)  several 
decisions  have  to  be  made. 
First, the  chosen  level  of  aggregation  is the  economy.  One  reason 
for this  choice  is data  availability,  another  the  fact  that  we  are  concerned 
with  aggregate  employment.  The  latter is influenced  by  the  relative price 
structure,  in particular the  terms  of  trade,  which  are  part  of equations  (9) 
and  (11).  However,  as  shown  in the  Note  for  the  Economic  Policy  Committee 
(1982),  ~ariations of  the  labour  share  in  manufacturing  industries  are  much 
more  pronounced  than  for  the economy  as  a  whole.  It  can  therefore  be  expected 
that  our  aggregate  results  hold  a  fortiori  for  manufacturing. 
Second,  the  choice of  time  periods.  Our  time  series extend  from  1960 
to  1982.  We  also  consider  three  subperiods  :  1960-1973,  1973-1979,  1979-1982. 
This  choice  is to  some  extent  arbitrary, but  the oil  shocks  of  1973  and  1979 
may  have  given  rise to  structural  changes.  To  test  the existence of  structural 
changes  for  these  subperiods,  we  have  estimated productivity  as  a  function  of 
time  with  splines for  the periods  1973-1979  and  1979-1982.  The  results  in 
Table  2  suggest  that  trend productivity growth  declined  after  1973  and  again 
after  1979.  Hence,  the  choice  of  subperiods  is  not  unreasonable. 
Any  measure  of  the  change  in  the  labour  share  neglects, of  course, 
the initial starting point.  The  rise  in the  Labour  share  can  be  expected  to 
have  a  Lesser  impact  on  employment  in  countries  where  before  1960  the  labour 
share  was  Low  compared  to others.  This  holds particularly for  Japan  whose 
Labour  share  was  the  lowest  among  the  countries  in the  sample  prior to  1960 
(when  an  adjustment  for  family  employment  is made),  although  the  significance 
of  a  comparison  of  absolute  labour  shares  is even  more  problematic  than  a 
comparison  of  growth  rates. T
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Third,  total  employment  comprises  employed  labour,  family  aids,  and 
the  selfemployed.  Over  a  20  years period the  number  of  selfemployed  has 
diminished,  in  some  countries drastically (e.g.  Italy).  The  same  is true of 
family  aids  although  their total  number  is still very  important  in  countries 
such  as  Italy  and  above  all  Japan.  We  have  left  family  aids  in the total 
employment  data,  partly  because  the statistical series on  family  aids  are 
unreliable  and  partly because their  shadow  wage  is difficult  to  assess.  The 
level  of  labour  shares is therefore  seriously  upward  biased,  and  the growth 
rates downward  biased.  To  assess  this potential  bias,  labour  shares  are 
recomputed  for  Italy and  Japan  excluding  family  aids. 
Labour  productivity  was  computed  dividing  GOP  by  the total  of employed 
and  selfemployed.  As  can  be  seen  from  definition  (2)  this is equivalent  to 
imputing  to  the  selfemployed  a  wage  rate  for  their  labour  input  equal  to the 
average  of  employed  workers.  For  example,  if selfemployed  in  agriculture 
earned  less  than  the  average of  employed  workers,  this difference  would 
implicitly  be  imputed  to negative profits.  This  procedure  seems  to  be  more 
consistent  than  using  only  dependent  employment  in definition  (2)  with  the 
result  of  declining  productivity  when  structural  shifts from  selfemployment 
to  dependent  employment  occur.  As  such  shifts  were  very  pronounced  over  the 
last  20  years  a  substantial  bias  would  be  introduced. 
Fourth,  net  labour  productivity is economically  more  meaningful  than 
gross  productivity.  However,  capital depreciation data  is notoriously 
arbitrary  and  hence  the  labour  share  of net  domestic  product  is less  reliable. 
In  Table  3  shares  for  both  gross  and  net  domestic  product  are  shown. -Their 
levels differ  significantly but  not  so  their evolution  although  the  rise in 
net  shares  is more  pronounced.  In  the  remainder  of  the paper  only the gross 
shares  are  retained. 
Finally,  an  expansion  such  as  (9)  or  (11)  is a  local  approximation 
whose  precision depends  on  the  magnitudes of  change.  The  approximation error, 
which  would  not  arise  with  multiplicative  index  numbers,  can  be  illustrated 
with  a  two-period  computation  of  the change  in productivity.  Indexing  the 
first  period  with  0  and  the  second  with  1, one  obtains  from  n = Y/E  : 
(12) -15-
The  continuous  approximation  yields  i  = Y- E and  the error of  approximating 
CJt1 - R0
)/R0  by  i  is equal  to  E01E1•  For  small  changes  in  E,  E0tE1  is 
close to  1  and  the error is negligeable.  We  indicate  changes  in  s  based  on 
computations  with  (12)  and  on  computations  with  approximations  (9) and  (11). 
3.2  Computations 
Computations  were  made  for  Belgium,  Germany,  France,  Italy, the  Nether-
lands,  the  United  Kingdom,  the  United  States,  and  Japan.  Definitions of 
variables  and  their statistical sources  are  given  in the  Appendix.  The  evo-
lution of  Labour  shares on  a  gross  and  net  basis is shown  in Table  3. 
In  no  country  did  labour  shares  decline over  the period  1960-1982, 
with  the  highest  increases occurring  in  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands.  For  Italy 
and  Japan,  the  growth  of  the  labour  share  is biased due  to  the  decline  in 
family  aids.  Two  alternative measures  are  therefore  shown  in  Table  3. 
We  now  turn  to  the  contributing  factors.  Table  4  summarises  the 
results  with  average  annual  growth  rates  and  their  variances  for  the period 
1960-81,  and  the  subperiods  1960-73  and  1973-79.  Since  data on  payroll  taxes 
is not  yet  available  for  1982,  the  results  for  the period  1979-82  are  slightly 
less  detailed. 
For  all  countries the  most  important  elements  are  real  consumption  wage 
growth,  terms  of  trade  changes,  and  productivity growth.  Across  the board,  tax 
and  structural  effects  are  less  important  although  in  some  countries  they  are 
non-negligeable. 
Tax  effects 
Payroll  taxes  (~T-~c)  contributed to  a  rise  in  labour  shares  in  all 
countries  with  the  exception of Italy.  The  strongest  increases occurred  in 
the  Netherlands,  followed  by  France  and  the  United  States  in  1960-71  and  in 
Belgium  during  1971-80. 
.. 
Indirect  taxes  and  subsidies  (pM- PF)  changed  only  marginally during 
the  whole  period.  With  the  exception of  the  United  Kingdom,  they declined or 
remained  constant  in  all  other  countries. T
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Structural effects 
The  structural effects are  measured  by  (pc- Pm)  and  (px- PM). 
Consumer  prices grew  more  rapidly  than  import  prices  in  all  countries during 
1960-79  except  in the  United  States,  while  export  prices grew  less  rapidly 
than  GDP  deflators  at  market  prices.  The  net  structural  effect on  labour 
shares  was  negative  in  most  countries  and  marginally positive in Germany. 
The  largest  negative effect of the  combined  structural effect  occurred  in 
the  Netherlands  and  in Italy. 
During  1973-79 the picture  changed  completely.  Import  prices  increased 
more  rapidly than  consumer  prices  in  all  countries,  suggesting  that  a  substan-
tial amount  of  inflation was  imported.  The  effect of the production  structure 
raised the  labour  share  very  strongly  in the  United  States,  but  was  favour-
able  for  France  and  Japan.  The  total  structural  effect  helped  to  reduce  the 
growth  of  the  labour  share  in  Japan  with  an  annual  average of - 4,8 per  cent, 
followed  by  France  with -3,6 per  cent,  Italy  with -3,6 per  cent,  and  the 
United  States  with  -3,7per cent.  The  variances of the  structural effects  are 
by  far  the  largest  among  the  contributing  factors  indicating that  the year-
by-year  changes  have  been  significant. 
After  1979,  Japan  continued to  hold  successfully the growth  of the 
consumer  price  index  far  below  the growth  of  import  prices.  A similarly 
successful  macroeconomic  management  is visible for  Belgium,  the  Netherlands, 
and  France.  Very  unsuccessful  were  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States. 
But  exporters  received  strong  price  increases  in  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands, 
thereby  adding  to the  increase  in  labour  shares.  The  total structural effect 
was  again  most  favourable  in Japan  and  most  problematic  in the  United  Kingdom 
and  the  United  States. 
Real  consumption  wage  payments 
For  both  periods  and  for  all  countries  real  consumer  wages  increased 
with  the  unique exception of  the  United  States during  1973-79.  The  largest 
increases during  1960-73 occurred  in  Italy, Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  the 
smallest  in the  United  States.  During  1973-79  the growth  of  real  wages 
decelerated  in  all  countries,  and  in the  United  States it became  evennegative. -22-
By  far  the  most  irregular  consumer  wage  growth  occurred  in the  United 
Kingdom  with  a  variance  more  than double  the variance  in  any  other  country 
for  the period  1973-79. 
For .. 1979-82,  the  two  corJl)onents  WT-wc  and  (Wc-Pc)  are  merged  to 
y!e ld  .. (WT- P  c > because  We  for  1982  was  not  yet  available.  The  component 
(WT- Pc>  contains therefore  changes  in payroll  taxes  and  changes  in real 
consumer  wages.  Product  wages  deflated by  consumer  prices grew  at  a  substan-
tially reduced  rate  after  1979  compared  to 1973-79.  In  four  countries  they 
actually declined,  most  so  in the  United  States  and  the Netherlands,  marginally 
in Belgium  and  Germany.  Only  in the  United  Kingdom  did they  increase  more 
strongly than  before  1979. 
Terms  of  trade 
The  terms  of trade  change  being  defined  as  Pm-Px  represents  a  loss 
when  the  change  is positive.  During  1960-73  all  countries benefited from 
small  terms  of trade gains, the  largest gains  accruing  to  Germany. 
In  the following  period  a  complete  reversal  occurred  :  all  countries 
suffered  from  terms  of trade  losses;  most  so  Japan  (9,1  per  cent  annual 
average)  followed  by  the  United  States  (4,6 per  cent>.  The  smallest  losses 
occurred  in the  United  Kingdom  (0,4 per  cent>  followed  by  Belgium,  the Nether-
lands,  and  Germany.  The  oil price hike  and  exchange rate movements  were  the 
major  factors  behind  the terms  of trade changes.  In  particular,  after  1973 
the  negative impact  of  higher oil prices on  the terms  of trade of  European 
countries  was  cushioned  by  the  appreciation of  European  currencies  in terms 
of  the dollar.  By  contrast,  the  us  terms of  trade were  victim of  higher  oil 
prices  and  of  a  simultaneously depreciating dollar. 
Productivity growth 
Over  the entire period productivity growth  was  highest  in Italy,  France, 
Belgium,  and  Germany  and  lowest  in the  United  States lZ  Nevertheless,  only  in 
the  United  States  has  productivity outgrown  real  wage  incomes.  Real  wage  income 
growth  exceeded  productivity 3rowth  corrected for  terms  of trade  losses  most 
11  The  productivity data for  Italy are,  however,  biased  upwards  due  to unpaid 
family  aids  being  left  in the erJl)loyment  data. -23-
significantly in  Italy  (by  3,8 percentage points  annually)  and  in  France 
(by  1,4 percentage points  annually). 
Problems  arose  and  accumulated  during  the period  1973-82.  To  take 
the example  of  France,  during  1960-73  real  wages  increased  by  4,9 per  cent 
annual  average,  offset  by  a  terms-of-trade corrected  annual  productivity 
growth  of  5,2 per  cent.  During  1973-79  real  wages  continued to grow  at 
3,4 per  cent  while  productivity growth  slowed  down  to  2,6 per  cent  and 
terms-of-trade  losses  represented  2,6 per  cent  so  that  the excess of  wage 
growth  amounts  to  3,4 per  cent. 
After  1979  productivity growth  decelerated  sharply everywhere  except 
in the  United  Kingdom,  which  also  is the only  European  country  enjoying  a 
terms of  trade again.  All  other  European  countries  and  Japan  had  terms-of-
trade  losses  far  in excess of productivity gains. 
During  the 1970s  productivity growth  in Japan  remained  higher  tnan 
in  Europe  but  the  margin  narrowed  and  became  insufficient  to  compensate  for 
the drastic deterioration of Japan's terms  of trade. 
Data  availability  limited  computations  based  on  formula  <11)  to the 
European  countries and  to  the period 1971-80. 
Table  5 gives  average  values  for  Z,  the growth  rate of  corporate  .. 
taxes  expressed  as  a  percentage of total  labour  costs,  and  for t, the growth 
rate of  the  share of  non-taxed  labour  income.  Only  non-zero  values  for  Z  .. 
affect  the  labour  viz.  the •profit  share,  while  t  ¢0 does  not  affects'. 
Table  5 
Additional  tax  and  productivity factors,  1971-80 
i  .. 
t 
Belgium  0.0  -1.0 
(0.3)  (1.4) 
Germany  0.0  -0.6 
(0.4)  ( 1 .3) 
France  0.0  -0.6 
(0.6)  (0.8) 
Italy  0.1  -0.9 
(0.2)  (0.9) 
Net her lands  0.1  -0.9 
(0.4)  (1.0) 
United  Kingdom  -0.1  -0.1 
(0.9)  ( 1.  7) -~-
Table  5  suggests that  changes  in corporate  taxes  have  not  much 
affected  income  distribution on  an  after-tax  basis.  The  averages  for  most 
countries  are  close to  zero  but  the  variances  are  very  large  so  that 
important  year-by-year  changes  have  taken place.  In  all  European  countries 
direct  taxation of  labour  income  has  increased  so  that  after tax  labour  incomes 
as  a  share  of gross  labour  incomes  have  declined.  This  effect  is most  pro-
nounced  in  Belgium  where  on  annual  average  the  ratio of net  to gross  labour 
income  has  declined  by  1  percentage point. 
From  the data presented  in this section the  following  conclusions  can 
be  drawn.  After  1973  real  consumption  wage  growth  decelerated  significantly 
everywhere.  But,  in  EEC  countries  and  Japan,  even  decelerated  real  wage  growth 
was  still in excess  of  the  warranted  rate of growth  of real  consumer  wages, 
namely  the one  compatible  with  constant  labour  shares.  One  reason  is the 
decline  in productivity growth  compared  to the  sixties.  Even  more  important 
are  the terms-of-trade  losses  which  industrial  countries experienced  after 1973, 
combined  with  increased payroll taxation.  Thus,  if one  considers the terms-of-
trade  losses of  the  seventies  as  essentially due  to  changes  in  competitivity 
and  to  resource transfers to oil-producing  countries,  it would  have  required 
a  more  pronounced  wage  moderation  and  lighter  social  security  contributions 
of  employers  than  those  which  took  place, to  slow  down  the  increase  in  labour 
shares. 
One  may  thus  be  tempted to  interpret  the  macroeconoMic  interdependencies 
as  follows.  Real  consumption  wage  growth  in  excess of  rates  compatible  with 
production growth  and  the terms of  trade  losses  has  induced  firms  to  reduce 
employment.  Governments  in general  attempted to stabilise this process  by 
subsidising  employment  in  industries  with  declining  competitivity  and  absorbed 
a  rising  share  of overall  employment.  As  a  consequence,  and  in  combination 
with  a  reduced  rate of  investment  for  capacity expansion,  the overall  producti-
vity declined.  Faced  with  the  need  to  finance  rising  transfer  payments  (subsi-
dies,  unemployment  compensations)  governments  in  some  countries  raised  revenues 
by  increasing  payroll  taxes,  thereby  closing  the  vicious  circle. 
The  evolution of  employment  and  of  labour  shares during  1960-1979 
exhibits  an  inverse  correlation  :  the  labour  share  in  Belgium  rose  most  strongly 
and  in  the  United  States  least  while  the  contrary  is true for  employment.  Only 
for  the  United  Kingdom  and  Japan  is the  correlation not  evident  but  this may  be 
explained  in  terms  of  tbeir  starting positions.  Japan  had  the  lowest  labour -25-
share  in  1960  and  in  spite of  rapid growth  still  in  1980  (when  corrected  for 
family  aids>,  while  the  United  Kingdom  had  in 1960  one  of  the  highest  labour 
shares. 
Section  4  pursues  this hypothesis  in  some  detail. 
4.  EMPLOYMENT  AND  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
4.1  Previous  work 
In  empirical  research  three  variables  are  usually  retained to 
estimate  the  relationship  between  employment  (or  unemployment)  and  wage 
costs  :  real  wage  costs, the  wage  gap,  and  labour•s  share.  Each  variable 
has  shortcomings  and  has  given  rise to  conflicting  empirical  results. 
Classical  employment  theory  yields a  negative  relationship  between 
employment  and  real  wages  whereas  the  Keynesian  predictions  are ambiguous-~/. 
A number  of empirical  studies  have  shown  a  procyclical  or  acyclical 
behaviour  of  real  wages  in the  United  States  (Dunlop,  1938;  Tarshis,  1939) 
as  well  as  in other  countries  (Geary  and  Kennan,  1982).  These  results 
are,  however,  not  accepted  without  criticism.  For  example,  Geary  and 
Kennan  deflate  labour  compensation  by  the  wholesale  price  index  instead of 
producer  prices and  fail  to take  into  account  the productivity  slowdown 
after  1973.  In  an  important  paper,  Sargent  (1978)  has  derived  a  classical 
labour  demand  function  from  an  intertemporal  maximisation  framework,  and 
has  obtained  a  statistically significant  lagged  response  of employment  to 
real  consumption  wage  changes  (instead of product  wages)  for  the  United 
States. 
Layard  et  al.  (1982)  have  estimated  labour  demand  in  manufacturing 
as  functions  of  the  product  wage,  the real  price of  materials  and  time 
(to  capture productivity growth)  for  five  countries.  They  obtain  several 
interesting  results.  Product  wage  growth  does  have  a  negative effect on 
employment  with  long  lags  as  suggested  by  Sargent.  When  the price of 
materials  is dropped  the  real  wage  elasticity also declines significantly, 
8/  For  a  discussion  of  the  Keynesian  theories,  see  Steinherr  and 
Van  Haeperen  (1983). -26-
providing  anothe~ explanation  for  the  independence  results obtained by 
Geary  and  Kennan.  The  estimated  real  wage  elasticity is around  1.4 which 
suggests that  the underlying  technology  has  substitution elasticities 
below  unity. 
Bruno  (1982)  distinguishes  supply-determined  and  demand-
determined  employment.  In  the  first  case  he  regresses employment  on  real 
consumption  wages,  the price of  imports  relative to the  consumer  price 
index, time  as  a  proxy  for  technical  progress  and  capital  accumulation,  and 
employment  one  period  lagged.  In  the  second  case,  he  regresses employment 
growth  on  output  growth,  the  variability of output  growth  and  wages  deflated 
by  import  prices.  In  pooled cross-section time  series regressions  for 
1961-80  and  including  up  to  10  OECD  countries,  the  wage  costs  variables  are 
highly  significant  and  have  negative  coefficients. 
Sachs  (1983)  uses  a  wage  gap  measure  (equation  <?a)  in  Section  2 
with  a=  1)  computed  from  data of  the  manufacturing  sector of  six  countries 
and  estimates unemployment  as  a  function  of  time,  the  wage  gap  (or  the  product 
wage),  the  lagged  dependent  variable  and  real  money  balances.  Except  for 
the  United  States he finds a significant positive relationship  between  the  wage 
gap  (or  the product  wage)  and  unemployment.  He  suggests that  the 
unemployment  wage  gap  relationship  may  be  acyclical  in the  United  States 
but  not  so  in other  countries. 
Few  researchers  have  related employment  and  distributive  shares. 
The  purpose  of  the empirical  work  presented  below  is not  to provide  a  full 
explanation of  variations  in  employment.  More  modestly  the objective  is to 
test  the  null-hypothesis that  variations  in distributive  shares  and  in 
employment  growth  are  unrelated. 
4.2  The  regression  eguations 
Econometric  results depend  obviously  on  the definitions of employment 
and  of  distributive shares,  and  on  the  chosen  functional  form  for  the 
regression  equations.  We  have  extensively experimented  with  alternative 
definitions  and  functional  forms.  We  first  discuss  the definitions of  the 
variables. -27-
For  the employment  variable, public  sector employment  is  subtracted 
from  total  employment  to  approximate  private  sector employment.  It  is this 
latter variable that  is expected  to be  sensitive to  changes  in  income  dis-
tribution. 
Regressions  were  run  both  with  net  and  gross  labour  shares.  The 
qualitative results  are  not  significantly different  so  that only  those 
obtained  with  gross  shares  are  reported. 
Demand  is approximated  by  domestic  GOP  at  constant  prices, or 
alternatively by  a  proxy  for  world  demand  <world  export  volume)  and  domestic 
monetary  policy  <M1 deflated  by  consumer  prices). 
For  the  interpretation of  the  results the  following  considerations 
have  to  be  kept  in  mind.  Employment  data  are  sometimes  of questionable 
reliability, particularly  in  Japan  and  Italy, where  family  aids  represent 
important  shares of  the  labour  force.  Furthermore,  in  some  countries varia-
tions  in the  labour  share  have  been  very  small  so  that  measurement  errors 
can  become  important. 
In  the  present  estimations,  as  in  most  empirical  work  based  on 
alternative  measures  of  labour  costs,  the  costs of  adjusting  the  labour 
force  are  neglected.  This  is a  serious  shortcoming  and  is likely to bias 
the  ~oefficient of  the  labour  cost  variable.  Particularly in  Europe,  firms 
incur  very  high  lay-off  costs.  This  implies that  wage  cost  reductions that 
are  perceived  as  temporary  will  not  stimulate  hirings  as  much  as  wage  cost 
reductions expected to be  maintained.  Our  results  are therefore  likely 
to  be  underestimates of  the employment  effects of  long-run  labour  cost, or 
labour  share,  variations. 
The  growth  rate of  value-added Y  can  be  decomposed  into the 
contributions of  the growth  of primary  production factors,  capital  (K),  and 
labour  (E)  and  the growth  of  factor  productivity 
where at is the growth  of  factor  productivity  and  aK  the  share of  capital 
in  value-added  (GOP).  Substitution of  (13)  into equation  <Sa>  then  yields -28-
where  a
0  = at/aK,  a1 :-ai{C1- a)aKJ,  a2 =  1,  and  e:t  is a  stochastic error 
term  with  the  usual  properties  assumed. 
If  the  capital  stock  grew  at  a  constant  rate  (14)  could  be 
written  as 
Equations  such  as  (15)  can  be  estimated  with  all  variables  expressed 
in growth  rates or,  alternatively,  in  Logarithms. 
The  Log-transformation  is mathematically  identical to  (15)  but 
presents different  statistical  characteristics.  In  the  Appendix  the  re-
gression  results  for  both  the equations  in growth  rates  and  in  Loqarithms 
are  given. 
Estimation  of  equation  (15)  poses  a  number  of  problems.  First, 
investment  is not  a  constant  and  is,  in fact,  highly  volatile.  Its omission 
from  the  equation  is therefore  Likely  to  generate  autocorrelated error  terms 
Et.  In  addition,  investment  depends  through  a  complicated  dynamic  relation-
ship  on  s.  The  estimated  coefficient  of  the  Labour  share  reflects therefore 
a  direct  and  indirect  (via  reduced  investment)  effect  on  employment. 
Second,  being  derived  from  an  equilibrium  condition,  equation  (15) 
does  not  hold  along  the  adjustment  path  and  theory  does  not  suggest  definite 
dynamic  constraints.  In  view  of  the  limited degrees  of  freedom  available 
with  annual  data,  and  the  fact  that  our  interest  is solely to test  whether 
employment  and  distributive  shares  are  related  in  a  statistically significant 
sense,  we  have  not  experimented  extensively  with  dynamic  models.  We  adopted 
two  dynamic  specifications.  In  the first  one,  all  explanatory variables  are 
Lagged  one  period.  This  assumes  that  firms  face  either  an  information or 
implementation  Lag  not  exceeding  one  year. 
In  the  second  specification  Longer  lags  are  introduced parsimoniously 
through  the  following  stock  adjustment  model  : 
( 16) -29-
where  E;  is the  desired  level  of  employment  at  timet  and  o" A~ 1  measures 
the  speed  of  convergence  of  actual  to desired  employment.  Logarithmic 
differentiation of  (16)  yields  : 
..  = A E"*  +  ( 1 - A) E  1  (17)  Et  t  t-
and  after  substitution of  (15)  for  E;  we  obtain 11 
( 18) 
with  a  =  AB  a 
o  o'  1 
*  Use  of  (15)  for  Et  implies, of  course,  that  in this equation,  as  in 
all  others,  the  change  in the  Labour  share  is expected to  be  p~rmanent.  This 
is  certainly  an  implausible  restriction  imposed  on  expectations. 
We  have,  however,  tested  leaded  values  of  the  explanatory  variables 
on  the  hypothesis that  firms  base  their employment  decisions  on  expected 
values of  demand  and  distributive share  and  that  their expectations  are  correct. 
Leaded  values  were  consistently  insignificant  allowing  us  .to  reject this joint 
hypothesis.  This  test gives  some  support  to our  a  priori  notion of  causality, 
namely  that  changes  in distributive  shares  cause  changes  in  employment  and 
not  the other  way  round. 
If output  is contrained  by  demand  conditions,  the  following  labour 
demand  function  can  be  derived 
where  a
0  = 0  if 'Yand  6  are  constants,  a1 = -o/(1- o),  and  a2 = 1.  Since 
demand  for  domestic  products  is not  truly exogenous  but  depends  on  employment 
and  on  the  labour  share,  the  OLS  assumptions  will  be  violated.  To  avoid 
9/  Regression  (18)  with  the distributive  s~are unlagged  yielded  much  inferior 
results.  Furthermore,  since  regression  (18)  is tainted  by  substantial 
multicollinearity  we  imposed,  a priori, various  values  for A.  The 
estimates of  the  labour  share  coefficient  remained  unchanged  so  that  we 
can  conclude  that  the  labour  share  coefficient  is not  affected  by  the 
multicollinearity problem.  The  Appendix  reproduces  only  the  equations 
with  unconstrained A
1S. -30-
this problem  Y is replaced  by  exogenous  demand  variables 
(Yw)  and  domestic  real  monetary  growth  CM1/Pc) 
(20)  E = a
0  + a1s  + a2vw  + a3<M1- Pc)  + £ t• 
real  world  demand 
In  Section  2  we  argued  that  it  may  be  justified to treat  the  real 
wage  variable  as  exogenous.  But  productivity growth  is to  a  large extent 
endogenous  and  responsive to  factor  price  changes.  (In the  limiting  case of 
o =  1  the equilibrium productivity  adjustment  exactly offsets the real  wage 
increase  and  leaves  the  labour  share  constant  although  employment  declines). 
To  take this problem  into  account,  we  redefine the proportional  change  of the 
labour  share as; =  ~- pF- •*, where  n*  is full-employment  productivity 
growth.  We  can  then  rewrite  the growth  of  the  labour  share  as 
s = (  w- pF- ~)  + (n- w*)  where  the first  term  is the  actual  labour  share  and 
the  second  term the deviation of  actual  productivity growth  from  its full 
employment  value,  i.e. the  w_age  gap  wg.  This  way  of  rewriting s allows  us 
to  introduce  s  and  wg  separately  into the employment  equation  : 
( 21) 
We  preferred not  to  restrict  a2 to equal  a1 because  even  the  sign of 
a2 is theoretically  ambiguous.  The  coefficient  of  the  wage  gap  is expected 
to  be  negative  when  Labour  substitution dominates.  But  it could  be  positive 
during  the  adjustment  process  if, due  to  high  adjustment  costs, employment  is 
reduced  Less  than output  after  a  real  wage  shock. 
Full  employment  productivity growth  n*  is approximated  by  trend 
productivity growth  as  estimated  in  Table  2.  The  decline  in trend productivity 
growth  after  1973  and  again  after  1979  is therefore taken  into  account. 
To  compare  the  results obtained  with  labour's  share  with  those  based 
on  real  wage  costs, the  following  equation  was  estimated  : 
A  A  A  ft 
(22)  E = a0 + a1<wT-pF)  +  a2<pm-pF)  + a3  (demand  variables)  +et, 
where  (WT-pF)  is the growth  of  the  real  product  wage  and  (pm-pF)  approximates 
the growth  of  input  costs  relative to output  prices.  Addition  of  the  input  cost 
variable  is shown  to  be  important  in  Bruno  (1982)  and  Layard  et  al.  (1982). -31-
4.3  Results 
The  regression  results  are  reproduced  in the Appendix.  None  of 
the equations  dominates  the  others  for  all  countries.  The  inadequacy of  the 
dynamic  specification is apparent  is several  ways.  For  one,  in  most  equa-
tions the  error  term  is autocorrelated so  that  we  had  to  introduce first-
and  second-order  autoregressive processes  for  the error terms.  Moreover, 
in the  logarithmic  specification the coefficients of  the  income  terms  often 
have  the  wrong  sign.  This  problem  largely disappears,  however,  when  the 
data  are  transformed  into growth  rates. 
Remarkable  is the fact  that  labour  shares  have  the right  sign  and 
are  statistically significant  in virtually all  countries either  when  estimated 
with  the  data transformed  to growth  rates or  with  logs,  or  in both  estimations. 
The  size of  the  labour  share  is relatively stable  for  each  country  across  the 
various equations estimated. 
For  Belgium,  the  labour  share  is highly  significant  in  all equations. 
Its  coefficient  is very  stable  in equations  (1)  to  (3)  but  drops  sharply  when 
Et_1  is  added  to  the explanatory variables.  This  suggests that  the effects 
of  an  increase  in the  labour  share  on  employment  are  distributed over several 
years. 
Demand  variables  are  significant  in  the  equations based  on  growth 
rates  but  cost  variables do  not  survive  an  F-test  (regression  17)  12Z 
By  contrast  labour's  share  passes the t-test  when  added  to demand  variables 
(regression  15). 
In  regression  (12)  the  wage  gap  is significant  suggesting  that  pro-
ductivity growth  accelerated through  labour  substitution. 
For  Germany,  the  labour  share  is highly  significant  in  all  regressions 
with  a  very  stable  coefficient  size.  The  wage  gap  is  weakly  significant  and 
has  a  negative  coefficient  in  regression  (12).  Labour  substitution,  stimu-
lating  production growth  but  harming  employment,  thus  may  have  occurred  in 
Germany  as  well.  Demand  variables either  have  the  wrong  sign  or  are  not 
10/  To  judge  whether  variables  should  be  retained  in  the  regression  equation 
we  use  the  F-test  criterion  (which  becomes  a t-test  in  case  of one  variable) 
suggested  by  Mizen  and  Richard  (1983). -32-
significant  in  most  regressions.  Using  the  F-test  criterion  we  conclude 
that  the  Labour  share  cannot  be  eliminated  from  the regressions and that demand 
variables  alone  are  insufficient  and  even  less  important  than  the  labour  share. 
This  is clearly demonstrated  by  binary  comparisons of  regressions  (1)  and  (2), 
(3)  and  (4),  (5)  and  (6),  (8)  and  (9),  and  <15)  and  (16). 
Good,  but  somewhat  less  satisfactory  results  are  also obtained  when 
the  labour  share  is replaced  by  cost  variables.  A rise  in  real  wage  costs is 
seen  to  have  a  strong  negative effect  on  employment  growth. 
For  France,  the  Labour  share  is highly  significant  in  the  Log-
equations  but  not  in the  regressions based  on  growth  rates.  In  the  latter 
regressions  wage  costs perform even  worse.  Comparison  of regression (6) and 
(7)  suggests that  the  labour  share  is to  be  preferred to  the  cost  variables. 
However,  domestic  demand  and  world  demand  appear  to  be  the  most  significant 
explanatory  variables for  France. 
For  Italy, neither  the  Labour  share,  nor  input  costs,  nor  demand 
variables  are  consistently significant  in  all  regressions.  In  regression  (3) 
the  labour  share  is significant,  as  is the  wage  gap.  Regressions  (11a)  and 
(11b)  also  attribute  significance to the  labour  shares. 
For  the Netherlands,  the  regression  results  are  also disappointing. 
Only  input  costs  are  significantly different  from  zero  in  all  regressions, 
but  not  real  wages,  nor  the  Labour  share,  nor  demand  variables.  Regressions 
(5)  to  (10)  are  the  ones  with  the  highest  explanatory  power,  theoretically 
expected  signs of  the  coefficients,  and  a  significant  Labour  share. 
In  the  regressions  for  the  United  Kingdom,  the  most  consistently 
significant  variable  is domestic  money  supply.  World  demand,  wage  and  input 
costs  have  Low  explanatory  power.  The  Labour  share  is significant  in  some re-
gressions,  but  seems  highly  correlated  with  the  money  variable.  Across re-
gressions  (1),  (5),  (6)  and  (11)  the  coefficient  of  the  Labour  share  is 
stable. 
The  labour  share  is the  most  significant  variable  across  all  re-
gressions  for  the  United  States.  Wage  and  input  costs  are  hardly  Pver 
significantly different  from  zero.  Inclusion of  Et_1 among  the  explanatory 
variables does  not  improve  the estimations,  suggesting  a  more  rapid  adjust-
ment  process  for  the  United  States than  for  the  European  countries.  Domestic -33-
demand  terms  ought,  not  surprisingly, to be more  important than world demand. 
The  best  results  are  therefore obtained  with  regressions  (1)  and  <11b). 
Unlike  Sachs  (1983)  we  conclude that  the  United  States  are  not 
a-typical.  Although  the  wage  costs  are  not  successful  in the employment 
regressions,  the  Labour  share  is very  significant. 
For  Japan,  demand  variables  are  never  significant.  Neither  wage  and 
input  costs  nor  Labour  shares  are  significant  in  the  log-equations.  Both  are 
consistently significant  when  growth  rates  are  used.  But  the explanatory 
f  h  .  .  l  h  l  l  .  ' 11 '  power  o  t  e  regress1ons  rema1ns  very  ow  so  t  at  no  c  ear  cone  us1ons  emerge. 
4.4  Forecasts 
Since  employment  declined  very  strongly  in  1982,  representative 
regressions privileging,  respectively,  labour  shares,  demand  conditions,  and 
wage  and  input  costs  were  reestimated  for  the period  1960-81.  Results  are 
reproduced  in  Table  6.  All  coefficients  Ly  inside of one  standard deviation 
around  the  coefficients estimated  from  the data  for  1960-82.  On  this crite-
rion  the  regressions  are  revealed  as  "structurally" stable.  For  most  countries 
the  smallest  forecast  errors  are  obtained  with  the  regressions  incorporating 
either the  Labour  share  or  production  costs. 
4.5  Summary 
From  this empirical  evidence  the  following  conclusions  can  be  drawn. 
For  some  countries  (the  Netherlands,  Italy  and  Japan}  no  satisfactory expla-
nation for the evolution  of  employment  was  found.  For  all  countries the 
dynamic  specification of  the equations  is wanting  but  the objective of  the 
exercise  was  not  to develop  a  fully  satisfactory dynamic  theory.  The 
regression  results  provide,  however,  solid empirical  support  for  the  pro-
position that  employment  cannot  be  explained  by  demand  conditions  alone,  and 
that  increases  in  Labour  shares  (or  in product  wages)  slow  down  employment 
growth.  The  results justify therefore  the  attention being  paid to  labour 
shares  in policy discussions  and  official documents  and  the  claim that  the 
increase  in  labour  shares  in  several  European  countries  has  had  a  negative 
effect  on  employment. 
(11)  Public  sector employment  data  is not  available for  Japan.  The 
dependent  variable  is total  employment. T
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5.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS 
In  the  economies  of  the  European  Communities  the  Labour  share 
increased,  in  some  countries substantially, during  the  sixties and  seven-
ties,  with  possible  negative effects on  employment  and  employment-creating 
investments.  In  this paper,  the growth  of  the  Labour  share  was  decomposed 
into  contributing  factors  which  are  either  under  control of  policymakers, 
such  as  tax  rates; or partially and  temporarily  under  their  control,  such  as 
the  terms  of trade;  and  factors  which  are  largely  exogenous  in the  short  run, 
such  as  economic  structure, or even  the growth  of  real  consumption  wages. 
Productivity growth  is a  special  case  since  changes  in employment,  in the 
terms  of  trade,  and  in  real  wages all  affect  productivity.  In  several 
countries it  is seen  that  taxation  has  contributed to  the  increase  in real 
wage  costs,  suggesting  therefore  immediately  policy  actions.  In  countries 
Like  Belgium  and  the  United  Kingdom,  governments  have  already  shown  awareness 
of  the  implications of  this tax  policy  for  distributive shares  and  the 
repercussions on  investment  and  employment. 
In  some  countries  (Belgium,  Italy)  wages  are  indexed  to  consumer 
prices.  In  this  case  any  exogenous  impact  on  the  Labour  share,  such  as  a 
deterioration of  the terms  of  trade,  could  only  be  offset  by  a  reduction  in 
taxation.  However,  as  was  seen before,  fiscal  pressure  was  sometimes  increased 
at  the time  terms  of  trade deteriorated.  If  one  takes  taxation  as  not  flexible 
enough  to offset  terms  of  trade fluctuations,  and  economic  structure  as  evolving 
only  slowly,  then  employment  can  only  be  protected  by  offsetting terms  of  trade 
fluctuations  through  appropriate  adjustments of  real  wages.  One  way  of 
achieving  this flexibility  automaticalLY  would  consist  in  indexing  wages  not 
to  consumer  prices but  to the  GOP  deflator.  This  proposal  is discussed  in 
Steinherr  (1978). 
The  hypothesis that  employment  is  independent  of  the evolution of  real 
wages  and  of  the  Labour  share,  and  is  Largely  determined  by  demand  conditions, 
is rejected  by  the  regression  analysis  in this paper.  Demand  conditions 
generally  do  matter,  but  as pervasive,  and  in  some  countries  even  more, 
is the  importance  of  supply  conditions,  captured  either  by  the  Labour  share or 
wage  and  input  costs.  The  policy  conclusions  for  stimulation of  employment 
growth  are  therefore  clear.  Most  promising  in  Europe's  current  situation 
would  be  demand  stimulation  with  a  simultaneous  control  over  real  wage  growth. 
Implementation  of  such  a  policy  may,  however,  be  difficult.  In  the past, -38-
expansionary  demand  policies have  facilitated  the growth  of  real  wages  and  of 
the  labour  share.  In  such  a  case  a  difficult  choice  has  to  be  made.  Demand 
reflation  without  a  corresponding  incomes  policy  may  fail  to  increase  employ-
ment.  Real  wage  reductions  with  unchanged  demand  policies  will  stimulate 
employment  but  Less  than  with  a  simultaneous  demand  reflation.  If  real  wages 
cannot  be  fo~ced to grow  at  a  rate  below  full  employment  productivity growth, 
then  policy  solutions other  than  demand  stimulation  must  be  sought.  One 
feasible  and  promising  policy  alternative  would  be  to  subsidise employment 
creation.  This policy  is proposed  and  analysed  in detail  in  Chiarella  and 
Steinherr  (1982)  and  Steinherr  and  Van  Haeperen  (1983). -39-
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I.  LIST  OF  VARIABLES  AND  DEFINITIONS 
PM  Price  deflator of  GOP  at  market  prices 
PF  Price deflator of  GOP  at  factor  cost 
Pc  Consumer  price  index 
P  Price  index  of exports of goods  and  services 
X 
P  Price  index  of  imports  of goods  and  services  m 
WT  Employment  compensation per  employee;  total  economy 
We  Gross  wages  and  salaries 
ET  Total  employment 
E0  Dependent  employment 
YGPF  Gross  domestic  product  at  current  factor  cost 
YNPF  Net  domestic  product  at  current  factor  cost 
TC  Current  taxes on  income  and  wealth  paid by  non-financial  corporate  sector 
TH  Income  taxes paid  by  households 
S 1  Social  contributions by  employees 
S2  Social  contributions by  self-employed 
Z  =  1 + TC  ( WTET) 
T  = TH  + S 1 + S 2 
SG  Gross  labour  share  (WTET/PFYG) 
SN  Net  labour  share  (WTET/PFYN) 
nG  Gross  productivity  (YG/ET) 
n N  Net  productivity  ( Y  N  /ET) 
Sources  SOEC  (Statistical  Office of  the  European  Communities) 
OECD  (National  Accounts) 
II.  TABLES 
OECD  (Labour  Force  Statistics) 
Estimates  by  Commission  Staff 
Regression  results  (1960-1982)  for 
•  Belgium 
•  Germany 
•  France  Employment  equations  : 
Italy  1)  All  variables  in  logs 
•  the  Netherlands  2)  All  variables  in growth  rates 
•  United  Kingdom 
•  United  States 
•  Japan A
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